dc.contributor.author | Elvik, Rune | |
dc.coverage.spatial | Norway | nb_NO |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-06-27T10:09:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-06-27T10:09:36Z | |
dc.date.created | 2015-02-06T10:57:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-12-23 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Transportation Research Record. 2014, 2465(1), 8-15. | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.issn | 0361-1981 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2602522 | |
dc.description.abstract | The paper presents a cost–benefit analysis of schemes rewarding drivers for not speeding. Three levels of the reward were defined: €20 per year, €300 per year, and €1,200 per year (corresponds to US$26, US$396, and US$1,586 at June 2013 exchange rate). It was estimated that these rewards would reduce the rate of speeding by 20%, 70%, and 95%, respectively. It was assumed that drivers would join a reward system voluntarily. Three groups of drivers were defined: one group, making up 50% of drivers, with an annual per driver accident rate 20% below the average for all drivers; a second group, 40% of drivers, with a per driver accident rate 10% below the average; and a third group, 10% of drivers, with a per driver accident rate 140% above average (i.e., a relative accident rate of 2.4). It was assumed that the safest drivers would be the first to join the program and that the least-safe drivers would be the last. Official Norwegian monetary valuations of the prevention of traffic fatalities and injuries were applied. The prevention of a fatality was valued at €3.46 million (2009 prices; equivalent to US$4.8 million in 2009). Benefits were found to be smaller than costs for all versions of the reward system and all groups of drivers except high-risk drivers in the system who were offered a €20 or €300 annual reward for not speeding. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | SAGE Publishing | nb_NO |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | Cost-benefit analysis of incentive systems rewarding compliance with speed limits | nb_NO |
dc.title.alternative | Cost-benefit analysis of incentive systems rewarding compliance with speed limits | nb_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | nb_NO |
dc.description.version | submittedVersion | nb_NO |
cristin.unitcode | 7482,0,0,0 | |
cristin.unitname | Transportøkonomisk institutt | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | preprint | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.3141/2465-02 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1217997 | |
dc.source.journal | Transportation Research Record | nb_NO |
dc.source.volume | 2465 | nb_NO |
dc.source.issue | 1 | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 8-15 | nb_NO |
dc.relation.project | Norges forskningsråd: 204339 | nb_NO |