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dc.contributor.authorFiva, Jon H.
dc.contributor.authorHalse, Askill Harkjerr
dc.coverage.spatialNorwaynb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-19T09:40:20Z
dc.date.available2019-12-19T09:40:20Z
dc.date.created2016-10-03T15:54:11Z
dc.date.issued2016-08-15
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economics. 2016, 143 (November), 15-26.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2634093
dc.description.abstractPork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts. Such behavior is expected to depend on the incentives imposed by the electoral system. We estimate the causal effect of local representation in a closed-list proportional representation system where individual candidates have no clear electoral incentive to favor their hometown. Using data from Norwegian regional governments, we still find a hometown bias. We document that municipalities with a representative on the regional council from the same party as the regional governor tend to obtain more funding for local investments. Citizens also tend to vote more often for parties whose gubernatorial candidate is from their own hometown, consistent with expectations of particularistic benefits. A possible explanation is that regional council members are often recruited from local politics and remain loyal to their roots. We find no evidence that regional council experience affects politicians' future career prospects at the local level.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleLocal favoritism in at-large proportional representation systemsnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.rights.holder© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.nb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
cristin.unitcode7482,3,1,0
cristin.unitnameSamfunnsøkonomiske analyser
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.002
dc.identifier.cristin1389123
dc.source.journalJournal of Public Economicsnb_NO
dc.source.volume143nb_NO
dc.source.issueNovembernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber15-26nb_NO
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 179552nb_NO


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal