Does capacity increase compliance? Examining evidence from European cooperation against air pollution
Peer reviewed, Journal article
Published version
Permanent lenke
https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2764710Utgivelsesdato
2020-09-15Metadata
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Originalversjon
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 2020, 21, 323-345. 10.1007/s10784-020-09497-1Sammendrag
Scholars commonly hypothesize that enhanced capacity—improved ability to do as agreed—increases states’ compliance with international agreements. In contrast, using a novel dataset that covers 31 states and three decades of cooperation, I find a negative effect of capacity on compliance. To help explain this seemingly counterintuitive finding, I offer a novel conjecture of the capacity–compliance relationship. In particular, I argue that the effect of capacity may vary substantially across states, because states’ intention to comply constitutes a crucial intervening variable. Among reluctant states pursuing policy goals that affect compliance negatively, high capacity may in fact cause noncompliance. I exemplify the conjecture through evidence from a high-capacity noncompliant state (Norway).