dc.contributor.author | Kokkvoll Tveit, Andreas | |
dc.coverage.spatial | Norway | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-07-16T13:28:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-07-16T13:28:26Z | |
dc.date.created | 2020-09-21T10:55:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-09-15 | |
dc.identifier.citation | International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 2020, 21, 323-345. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1567-9764 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2764710 | |
dc.description.abstract | Scholars commonly hypothesize that enhanced capacity—improved ability to do as agreed—increases states’ compliance with international agreements. In contrast, using a novel dataset that covers 31 states and three decades of cooperation, I find a negative effect of capacity on compliance. To help explain this seemingly counterintuitive finding, I offer a novel conjecture of the capacity–compliance relationship. In particular, I argue that the effect of capacity may vary substantially across states, because states’ intention to comply constitutes a crucial intervening variable. Among reluctant states pursuing policy goals that affect compliance negatively, high capacity may in fact cause noncompliance. I exemplify the conjecture through evidence from a high-capacity noncompliant state (Norway). | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.rights | Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | Does capacity increase compliance? Examining evidence from European cooperation against air pollution | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | © The Author(s) 2020 | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10784-020-09497-1 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1831552 | |
dc.source.journal | International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 21 | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 323-345 | en_US |